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Bruegel, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, and the Pe-
terson Institute for International Economics held a joint workshop in Wash-
ington on February 8 and 9, 2007, on how to achieve an orderly reduction 
in global imbalances. Thirty of the world’s leading experts presented analyses 
and evaluations of the requirements for such an adjustment. The discussions 
centered on two sets of contributions: (1) country papers that provided a 
perspective on the underlying factors behind surpluses and deficits and the 
scope for adjustment in the current account and (2) multicountry simulation 
papers that produced estimates of the changes in policy variables and the cor-
responding exchange rate adjustments that are consistent with scenarios for a 
reduction in current account imbalances. This policy brief, by six experts from 
the organizations that hosted this workshop, reports on the results and the reports on the results and the 
workshop discussions and outlines an adjustment package that would address 
the global imbalances.
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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
ton: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2006).
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The decision by the House of Representatives on April 10 to 
change the rules for Congressional action on trade agreements 
drives a gaping hole in US trade policy and poses the gravest threat 
to the global trading system in decades. By rejecting long-settled 
procedures that prevented Congressional sidetracking of trade 
deals  agreed  by  fully  authorized  Presidents,  it  instantaneously 
destroyed the credibility of the United States as a negotiating 
partner in the eyes of the rest of the world. Unless reversed soon, 
the House action will severely damage both the US economy and 
US foreign policy. It will particularly undermine the presumed 
goal of any new Administration in 2009 to restore our country’s 
standing as a reliable partner in a cooperative multilateral world.
The main issue is not Colombia, although it is both regret-
table and ridiculous that the House maneuver took place on a 
bill  that  sought  to  implement  the  Administration’s  free  trade 
agreement with that country. It is regrettable politically because 
Colombia is our leading ally in South America and needs all 
possible help in its battles against drug dealers and terrorists, 
and  because  US  rejection  will  provide  powerful  ammunition 
for Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s campaign against the 
United States. It is ridiculous economically because virtually all 
Colombian products already enter our market duty-free while the 
agreement would provide substantially enhanced access to the 
Colombian market for US firms and workers, and because the 
murders of Colombian trade unionists that are the alleged reason 
for House rejection are totally unrelated to the trade deal. 
The overriding issue, however, is the impact of the House 
move on overall US trade policy and thus the global trading 
regime. The unique Constitutional system of the United States, 
under which Congress is responsible for “foreign commerce” but 
the President has authority to negotiate with other governments, 
has  required  the  creation  of  special  procedures  to  mesh  with 
the  parliamentary  systems  of  other  countries  where  executive 
and legislative branches almost always work together. Without 
arrangements that assure reasonably prompt Congressional action 
on agreements as negotiated by the Executive, other countries will 
legitimately fear that Congress will simply let the deals languish 
or insist on further concessions. The House was in fact doing both 
with respect to the pending agreement with Colombia before 
the Administration forced the issue by submitting implement-
ing legislation. Facing such circumstances, other countries will 
not take on the domestic political battles surrounding their own 
liberalization of trade barriers and thus will not engage seriously 
with the United States in either multilateral or bilateral talks.
This is not theory but history. One of President Kennedy’s 
crowning achievements, the Kennedy Round of trade negotia-
tions of the 1960s, was shorn of two of its major components 
by Congressional refusal to approve or even vote on them. That 
action unbalanced the agreement so severely that a furious Euro-
pean Community, our main trading partner then and now, with-
drew important commitments of its own and made clear that it 
would never again negotiate with the United States without firm 
assurance against the recurrence of such an outcome. The other 
major trading nations took similar positions.1
The result was the “fast track” process, embodied in trade 
legislation  in  1974  and  renamed Trade  Promotion  Authority 
(TPA) in 2002. Under those rules, devised largely by Democratic 
legislators and fully respected by both parties until now, Congress 
agreed to vote on trade agreements submitted by the President 
within a fixed period of time and without amending their terms 
1. The episode is described in Destler (2005, 71–77).
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provided that Congress authorized the talks in advance and 
Administration trade officials consulted closely with key legisla-
tors throughout the process (Destler 1997). This approach has 
enabled the United States, under Presidents and Congressional 
majorities of both parties, to participate effectively in interna-
tional trade negotiations ever since. It provided the basis for 
the three subsequent large multilateral initiatives —the Tokyo 
Round of the 1970s, the Uruguay Round of the 1990s and 
the current Doha Round—and the series of free trade pacts 
starting with Israel and Canada in the 1980s that continued 
through NAFTA up to Peru most recently. It has thus permit-
ted the global trading system to move steadily forward toward 
greater openness, with major benefits for the United States 
and the world economy as a whole.
The House action abruptly and unilaterally terminates this 
highly successful system. The immediate effect is to end any 
remaining prospect for early conclusion of the Doha Round 
in  the World Trade  Organization,  with  full  blame  for  that 
outcome directed to the United States, and to scuttle the pend-
ing free trade agreements with Panama and South Korea as well 
as Colombia. 
The much more profound impact, however, is to remove 
the  United  States  from  any  significant  international  trade 
negotiations for the foreseeable future. The chief current or 
former trade officials of three of the world’s largest trading 
entities have told me since April 10 that “the United States 
has now lost all credibility with its trading partners around the 
world and no one will negotiate with it.” The House’s explicit 
repudiation of the timing deadlines under TPA, which were 
one of its central features, is far worse than the expiration of the 
authority last summer (as in earlier periods) when it was widely 
assumed that renewal was only a matter of time and, in any 
event, the integrity of the authority remained intact. The “time 
out” proposed for trade policy by one of the major Presidential 
candidates, a central goal of the opponents of globalization, has 
already been called.
The United States will suffer severe economic and foreign 
policy costs if the House action is permitted to stand. Careful 
studies at our Peterson Institute for International Economics 
show that the US economy is $1 trillion per year richer as a 
result of the trade liberalization of the past sixty years and that 
we would gain another $500 billion per year if the world could 
move to totally free trade. This translates into respective gains 
of  about  $10,000  and  $5,000  per  US  household.2  History 
clearly demonstrates that failure to continue opening markets 
creates a policy vacuum that leads to protectionist backsliding 
so that losses of some of the previous sizable benefits are likely 
to compound the large foregone gains (Destler and Noland 
2006, 17-20).
The European Union, and the large and dynamic econo-
mies of Asia, will now strike trade compacts among themselves 
that discriminate against the United States rather than doing 
deals with us.  Examples will probably include EU-Korea and 
perhaps EU-India, and eventually an Asia-wide trade area. We 
will lose billions of dollars worth of exports and the associated 
high-paying jobs. The multilateral trade system, including the 
highly effective dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO, 
will erode further and weaken our ability to tear down barriers 
in China, India and other large emerging markets.
These  developments  could  not  come  at  a  worse  time.   
Substantial improvements in our trade balance, fortified by 
continued growth abroad and a highly competitive dollar, are 
now cushioning our economic slowdown and in fact represent 
the strongest component of the US economy. Over the past 
six months, the fourth quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 
2008, gains in “net exports” accounted for the entire growth of 
gross domestic product.
Most profound of all will be the impact on US foreign 
policy.  Any  new  US  Administration  next  year  will  seek  to 
reverse the legacy of unilateralism inherited from its predeces-
sor. But effective withdrawal from the international trading 
system moves in the diametrically opposite direction. This will 
be especially costly as the new President seeks to restore US 
leadership on key global issues, notably climate change with its 
central trade policy dimension. The next President will be very 
badly served by inheriting such a mess on trade and will have 
to eventually resolve this acute policy contradiction.
It would help if Congress and the present Administration 
could pick up the pieces and pass the Colombia agreement, and 
the pending South Korea and Panama agreements as well.  But 
2. The methodology and results are presented in Bradford, Grieco and 
Hufbauer (2005).
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the fundamental problem of US international credibility on 
trade will remain until a foolproof  Trade Promotion Authority, 
or some equivalent successor, is renewed and indeed ensconced 
permanently.  This  can  only  be  done,  probably  by  the  next 
Administration, as part of a “grand bargain” that recognizes 
the costs of liberalization and thus includes a major expansion 
of governmental assistance to workers dislocated by trade and 
perhaps other sources of dynamic change in our economy.   
In the absence of such a renewed foundation for an open and 
active US trade policy, both our economy and our foreign 
policy will suffer severely.
. Detailed proposals are presented in Kletzer and Rosen (2005).
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